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LABOR LAW-PICKETING A HOME-ANTI-INJUNCTION STATUTES

-A private chauffeur was discharged, allegedly for union activity.
The union had the home of the Offending employer picketed by
its representative who was arrested and convicted on a charge of
disorderly conduct. Defendant argued that the public policy expressed in the Minnesota anti-injunction statute' made peaceful
picketing in a labor dispute legal. Held, conviction affirmed. The
statute relied on by the defendant applies only to industrial disputes. The home is not a business, trade, or occupation within the
meaning of the anti-injunction statute. State v. Cooper, 205 Minn.
333, 285 N.W. 903 (1939).
The Norris-LaGuardia Act 2 and similar anti-injunction statutes climaxed a bitter fifty years' battle against the injunction as
a weapon in labor disputes." Since the greatest obstacle in the
path of those wishing to abolish this weapon has been narrow
construction by the courts of similar legislation in the past, 4 the
latest anti-injunction statutes are couched in the broadest language possible."
period than five years. Hill v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 8 F. Supp. 80 (D.C. La.
1933) noted in (1935) 9 Tulane L. Rev. 444; Page v. New Orleans Public Service, 184 La. 617, 167 So. 99 (1936). It has been recently stated that a contract
of employment for more than five years is not void ab initio, but is unenforceable only in so far as it is in excess of five years. Shaughnessy v. D'Antoni, 100 Fed. (2d) 422 (C.C.A. 5th, 1938), noted in (1939) 13 Tulane L. Rev.
467. But this case should have no application here as the employee attempted
to bind himself for 10 years, whereas a professor does not bind himself for
any specific time. See Note (1935) 9 Tulane L. Rev. 444.
In cases arising under the Louisiana Teachers' Tenure Act, La. Act 100
of 1922, § 48 as amended by La. Act 58 of 1936 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 22672267.1], Art. 167 was not considered, and the parish boards have been held
to the strict provisions of the Act giving life tenure to teachers employed for
three years. Andrews v. Union Parish School Board, 184 So. 574 (La. App.
1938), affirmed in 191 La. 90, 184 So. 552 (1938); Read v. Union Parish School
Board, 185 So. 67 (La. App. 1938). Marriage is not one of the grounds upon
which a permanent teacher can be removed under the Louisiana Teachers'
Tenure Act. State v. Jefferson Parish School Board, 191 La. 102, 184 So. 555
(1938). However, according to the Attorney General's opinion parish schools
are not affected by La. Act 15 of 1940 (E.S.).
1. Minn. Stat. (Mason, Supp. 1936) §§ 4255-4260.23.
2. 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-115 (Supp. 1939).
3. Frankfurter and Greene, The Labor Injunction (1930).
4. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 41 S.Ct. 172, 65 L.
Ed. 349 (1921); American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 42 S.Ct. 72, 66 L.Ed. 189 (1921); Bedford Cut Stone Co. v.
Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37, 47 S.Ct. 522, 71 L.Ed. 916 (1927);
Goldberg, Bowen & Co. v. Stablemen's Union, 149 Cal. 429, 86 Pac. 806, 8
L.R.A. (N.S.) 460 (1906); Bull v. International Alliance, 119 Kan. 713, 241 Pac.
459 (1925); Gevas v. Greek Restaurant Workers' Club, 99 N.J. Eq. 770, 134
Atl. 309 (1926); Heitkemper v. Central Labor Council, 99 Ore. 1, 192 Pac. 765
(1920). See also Frankfurter and Greene, op. cit. supra note 3.
5. Cf. Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, §§ 4, 13 (1932), 29 U.S.C.A. §§
104, 113 (Supp. 1939).
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Under these recent acts the courts are denied jurisdiction to
issue injunctions against any peaceable non-fraudulent activity
of parties in a labor dispute "regardless of whether or not the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee."'6 As long as a labor dispute as defined in the act 7 exists,
the background of the dispute or motives involved are immaterial." The question of the legality or illegality of the end does
not arise, 9 and the fact that none of the plaintiff's employees are,
or wish to become, members of the union engaged in the dispute
10
makes no difference.
The key to the applicability of such acts lies in the given
definition of a labor dispute, which is, of course, subject to judicial interpretation. This involves two questions: (1) whether or
not the purpose of the picketing has anything to do with wages,
hours, working conditions or representation; 1 and (2) whether
or not the relationship of the parties can give rise to a labor dispute within the intendment of the act. It is with this latter question that this note is primarily concerned.
6. 47 Stat. 73, § 13c (1932), 29 U.S.C.A. § 113c (Supp. 1939). The Massachusetts anti-injunction statute leaves out the phrase "regardless of whether
or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and
employee." Mass. Gen. Laws (1935) c. 407. Therefore, it has been held that no
labor dispute can exist under their act unless employees of the plaintiffemployer are involved. Simon v. Schwachman, 18 N.E. (2d) 1 (Mass. 1938);
Quinton's Market v. Patterson, 21 N.E. (2d) 546 (Mass. 1939).
7. The Norris-LaGuardia Act, which is copied almost verbatim In most
state acts, defines a labor dispute as follows: "The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or
concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of employer and employee." 47 Stat. 73, § 13c (1932), 29 U.S.C.A. § 113c
(Supp. 1939).
8. New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552, 58 S.Ct. 703,
82 L.Ed. 1012 (1938).
9. Wilson & Co. v. Birl, 27 F. Supp. 915 (E.D. Pa. 1939).
10. Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468, 57 S.Ct. 857, 81
L.Ed. 1229 (1937); Lauf v. Shinner and Co., 303 U.S. 323, 58 S.Ct. 578, 82 L.Ed.
872 (1938); New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552, 58 S.Ct.
703, 82 L.Ed. 1012 (1933); Geo. B. Wallace Co. v. International Ass'n, 155 Ore.
652, 63 P. (2d) 1090 (1936); American Furniture Co. v. International Brotherhood, 222 Wis. 338, 268 N.W. 250, 106 A.L.R. 335 (1936). Contra: Simon v.
Schwachman, 18 N.E. (2d) 1 (Mass. 1939); Feller v. Local 144, 121 N.J. Eq.
452, 191 AtI. 111 (1937); Safeway Stores v. Retail Clerks' Union, 184 Wash.
322, 51 P. (2d) 372 (1935).
11. For example, picketing for the purpose of retiring plaintiff's product
from competition in that particular territory was held to be no labor dispute. Fehr Baking Co. v. Baker's Union, 20 F. Supp. 691 (W.D. La. 1937).
Also, many courts hold that there is no labor dispute between a union and
a neutral in cases of secondary boycotts. See Smith, Coercion of Third Parties
in Labor Disputes-The Secondary Boycott (1939) 1 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
277, 301.
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No distinction based on the size of the employer's business
is made in the anti-injunction statute. Thus, where a union
picketed a tile layer who employed a single non-union helper,
for the purpose of making the employer cease work himself and
give the job to a union man, a labor dispute was held to exist.12
Similarly, where an attempt was made to organize a corporation
owned and operated by four brothers and their mother without
outside assistance, the dispute was held to be within the New
York act."' However, if a person hires no one and does all the
work himself, it has been held that no labor dispute with him
can arise.' 4
The home and charitable institution present a slightly different problem. The act has been held inapplicable to charitable
institutions. This ruling is based primarily on the view that an
institution operated on a non-profit basis is not a trade, industry,
or occupation. 5 Since the court found no labor dispute cases involving such institutions prior to the passage of the acts, it concluded that the legislature could not have had them in mind. The
same type of reasoning was applied in the instant case.
While the exploitation of labor is not normally associated
with small businesses, charitable institutions or the home, the
possibility of abuse in these fields is present. Whether the normal
remedies available in labor disputes should be allowed is a question which only time will answer. The caution and diversity of
opinion on the subject are well illustrated by the principal case.
Three judges felt that the home was not included in the act; two
believed the decision on the point in question was unnecessary
and should be reserved; and another dissented from the prevailing view.
Unquestionably, domestic help and employees of charitable
institutions have a right to reasonable wages and hours, and organization is one means of protection against unfair treatment
of such employees. On the other hand, employers of this type are
not as well-equipped to fight back as are larger businesses. There
12. Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468, 57 S.Ct. 857, 81
L.Ed. 1229 (1937).
13. Boro Park Sanitary Live Poultry Market v. Heller, 280 N.Y. 481, 21
N.E. (2d) 687 (1939).
14. Thompson v. Boekhout, 273 N.Y. 390, 7 N.E. (2d) 674 (1937); Bieber
v. Bininbaum, 6 N.Y.S. (2d) 63 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Pitter v. Kaminsky, 7 N.Y.S.
(2d) 10 (Sup. Ct. 1938). Contra: Rohde v. Dighton, 27 F. Supp. 149 (W.D. Mo.
1939).
15. Jewish Hospital of Brooklyn v. Doe, 252 App. Div. 581, 300 N.Y. Supp.
1111 (1937), criticized in Note (1937) 7 Brooklyn L. Rev. 380.
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is danger that in these cases labor unions, because of the weakness of.their foe, may do more harm than good if they are sufficiently encouraged. Experience in the building trades and associated
industries has proved that labor organizations, when given absolute control, are not above extortion and similar practices." To
deny the small businessman the use of the injunction may put
him completely at the mercy of the labor racketeer. Also, the
possibility that labor's cause may be hurt by going further than
the public believes justified should not be overlooked.
L.W.R.

TUTORSHIP-RIGHT OF SURVIVING PARENT TO CUSTODY OF CHILDA habeas corpus proceeding was instituted by the father to obtain
the tutorship of his minor child. The trial judge dismissed the
writ on the grounds that: (1) the child was being cared for properly by its grandparents; and (2) the custody of a child of such
a tender age should not be changed merely because the father
came into court to ask for it. Held, affirmed. State ex rel. Landry
v. Robin, 192 So. 349 (La. 1939).1
As a general rule, upon the death of either parent, the other
is entitled to the tutorship of minor children as of right. 2 Only in
the event of "unfaithfulness of his administration, notoriously
bad conduct, and abandonment of his children and failure to support and maintain them for more than one year" can the father
be excluded from the tutorship.$ In the earlier cases this right
was regarded as absolute unless the specific causes of exclusion
were proven.4 Later, however, the welfare of the child became the
determining factor in awarding letters of tutorship 5 and it is now
16. For a discussion of "labor racketeering," see (1937) 37 Col. L. Rev. 993.

1. Three justices dissented from the holding of the majority. On rehearing, the case was remanded for further finding of facts with two justices dissenting.

2. Art. 250, La. Civil Code of 1870.
3. Art. 305, La. Civil Code of 1870.
4. Tutorship of Kershaw, 5 Rob. 488 (La. 1843). See also In
of Upton, 16 La. Ann. 175 (1861).

5. La. Act 79 of 1894 [Dart's Stats. (1939)

re Tutorship

§ 4887] provides: "Whenever

an affidavit shall be made before any district judge that the physical or moral
welfare of any child in the state is seriously endangered by the neglect, or
abuse, or the vicious, or immoral habits, or associations, of its parents, or
parent, tutor, or other person having the custody of such child, or that the
physical or moral welfare of any such child is seriously endangered by the inability, refusal or neglect of such parents, parent or tutor or custodian to
properly care for such child, it shall be the duty of such district judge to
summon witnesses, as to the facts set forth in such affidavit, and also such
parents, or parent, tutor or custodian of such child, and if the proofs be

